Abstract-Agents in networks have two strategic choices: They can forward/process incoming service requests -or not, and they can establish additional contacts and maintain or terminate existing ones. In other words, an agent can choose both an action-selection and a link-selection strategy. So far, it is unclear which equilibria exist in such settings. We show that there are the following equilibria: First, an inefficient one where agents leave the network. Second, an equilibrium where agents process requests on behalf of others, i.e., they cooperate. In this second equilibrium, agents distribute their contacts uniformly, which is not efficient. We show that a strategy, we propose in this paper, yields an equilibrium that is optimal, i.e., that yields the highest sum of payoffs over all equilibria. If agents base their link-selection decisions on the processing times of their requests, optimal system states can be equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, network formation has become an important research topic. Agents 1 in networks may act as servers and provide services or information, e.g., process an incoming request, and at the same time they want to consume services provided by others, i.e., act as clients. In this paper, we consider networks where agents may be both client and server. While an agent is interested in consuming services from many different agents, it typically is linked to only few nodes in the network. Thus, an agent may have to send its service requests (requests for short) via intermediate nodes. Since forwarding agents can always drop requests, there is a general interest in short forwarding chains, i.e., those with few intermediate nodes. In combination with the processing of requests, we investigate another dimension of an agent's strategy space, link selection. While we assume that there is a given underlying network structure, i.e., each node has contacts it cannot choose, there are links/contacts an agent can choose, i.e., additional contacts. In this paper, a link between agents is bilateral: Both agents can use it and have to pay for it.
Strategic Choices An agent has certain strategic choices: (a) It can forward or process a request -or not. When 1 In this article, we use 'agent' and 'nodes' as synonyms.
forwarding, it can decide which agent to forward to. (b) It can establish additional contacts or terminate existing ones. We refer to the first choice as action selection, and to the second one as link selection. Networks with these features are ubiquitous, e.g., social networks, cooperation between companies, or P2P networks. Link selection is indeed an issue since maintaining contacts typically incurs costs. While agent behavior includes both link selection and action selection, existing work typically deals with only one aspect (see Section II). Given this, we study agent behavior under a strategic perspective, i.e., node behavior is driven by utility considerations, and address the fundamental question which equilibrium states arise.
Research Questions This paper addresses the following research questions: (a) Which link-selection strategies and action-selection strategies do agents use, and which equilibria exist? Equilibria are a fundamental concept in game theory, and finding them is necessary to analyze strategic choices. (b) A fast answer often is more valuable than a slow one, and we model this with a discount factor. How does this specific parameter affect the strategic choices of nodes? (c) If equilibria exist, how efficient are they? In efficient networks, the sum of the payoffs of all agents, i.e., the social welfare, is maximal, or, more practically, agents process almost all requests, and the number of intermediaries is small. (d) The relationship between nodes depends on their ability to estimate the degree of cooperation of other nodes. When this ability becomes weaker/stronger, how does this affect the equilibria?
Identifying equilibria in networks where more than two players process a request tends to be difficult [1] . Taking into account link selection makes the problem of identifying equilibria even more involved [2] .
Contributions As a first step of our analysis, we specify a strategy space that is very general, i.e., subsumes strategies known from literature. While [3] has identified network structures that are optimal, it is unclear if they are equilibria. We now have conducted a theoretical analysis of the setting described before that shows the following: There are two equilibria. (I) The inefficient network: If agents do not cooperate enough, they are dissatisfied with the system as a whole and leave the network. (II) The cooperative equilibrium: Uncooperative behavior does not yield high payoffs, since agents ignore requests from uncooperative nodes. Consequently, uncooperative strategies do not pay off, and thus, the degree of cooperation is high. If agents exclusively take contacts of their contacts -and not the request-processing performance of their contactsinto account when processing requests, then the optimal strategy is distributing additional contacts uniformly over the network. The resulting network structure is not efficient [3] . A better outcome is possible if agents do not only distinguish between cooperative/uncooperative behavior of other nodes, but take the response times of requests forwarded into account. We propose a strategy, dubbed Drop-Slow-Contacts (DSC), as follows: Nodes drop additional contacts where response times are too high. As a core result of this paper, we show that the DSC is an equilibrium strategy that increases the social welfare, and yields high payoffs.
If agents use the DSC Strategy, then they give each of their contacts an incentive to distribute its additional contacts in a way that is beneficial for the whole system. DSC is cheap, i.e., does not need complex computations or extra messages, and yields high payoffs.
Paper Outline Section II discusses related work. We describe some fundamentals in Section III. Our analysis is in Section IV, and Section V concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
This section addresses related work regarding action selection and link selection.
Action Selection Game-theoretic models [5] , [6] , [7] as well as behavioral models [8] , [9] can help to understand action-selection strategies. First, there are motives for malicious behavior: [8] explains the evolution of ideologically motivated attacks, and describes a set of countermeasures. [9] shows how nodes propagate viruses in an email network, and describes how to immunize against this malicious propagation. The (Iterated) Prisoners' Dilemma [5] explains why free-riding may occur. On the contrary, [6] , [7] show that cooperation can evolve through different strategies: Indirect reciprocity and reputation [6] as well as network reciprocity, and group selection [7] . Indirect reciprocity means that Node i only chooses the cooperative strategy towards Node j if j has done so towards other nodes. Reputation in [6] depends on the observations of the node itself as well as on third-party opinions, i.e., feedback. [10] proposes a payment scheme for feedback so that issuing truthful feedback is the optimal strategy. Network reciprocity is indirect reciprocity between members of a forwarding chain. The models used in [6] , [7] leave aside intermediate nodes, which is important in real-world networks. Even though intermediate nodes are important in real-world networks, investigating them analytically is difficult [1] . [11] analyzes the cost of selfish routing compared to a centralized solution:
The latency is close to optimal in a given network, even though nodes route based on utility considerations. Thus, no centralized instance is necessary for routing. In contrast to our approach, [11] assumes that a network structure is given. In general, however, the structure is the result of the behavior of the agents. Analyzing multi-player games is difficult if the network structure is taken into account [2] . All the approaches mentioned leave network formation aside. The network structure can influence the outcome of a game [12] . Thus, we investigate network formation as well.
Link Selection Network-formation models [13] , [14] , [15] describe which networks emerge from link selection of nodes. [16] shows which network topologies guarantee strong equilibria, i.e., states where no group of nodes can improve the payoff of each of its members. [17] uses link blocking to minimize the propagation of undesirable data in the network. [13] proposes the Connections Model: A node benefits from nodes it is directly or indirectly linked with. The benefit decreases, the larger the path length between two nodes is. [13] shows that nodes form different networks contingent on contact-maintenance costs: If contactmaintenance costs are less than the decrease of benefit between a contact and the contact of the contact, complete networks where a node is linked to any other node are efficient. If contact-maintenance costs are higher than the expected benefit of a new contact, empty networks, i.e., those where no node has a contact, result. For other contactmaintenance costs, star networks are efficient, i.e., one node (the center) is linked to all other nodes. With interaction selection, the star is not an equilibrium. The center of the star can increase its payoff by giving up the center position. Instead, we will focus on situations where all agents have about the same number of contacts. This setup is more likely since the motivation for having many more contacts than other agents is unclear if the costs of maintaining contacts are the same for all agents. Investigating heterogeneous cost structures would be an interesting extension of our work. We are interested in finding equilibria for networks where agents choose their action-selection strategy and their linkselection strategy, in contrast to [13] . [14] comes to results that are similar to [13] , but also points out which kinds of hot spots, i.e., nodes with high forwarding load, arise from different networks. Both [13] , [14] leave out action selection, i.e., do not allow their nodes to drop requests or to use utility-based routing algorithms. Still, [13] , [14] show the difference between efficient networks and the equilibria: Self-interested nodes do not form efficient networks in every situation.
Combined Models In simple scenarios with restrictive assumptions there are models that feature both link and action selection: [12] investigates two types of 2 × 2 games of players that form networks. There, the network structure depends on link costs and on the distribution of strategies among all nodes. [18] shows, in a behavioral experiment, that the network structure influences the payoff of players in network-trade games. There, equilibrium theory is a good predictor for human behavior. Thus, link selection and action selection should be investigated in combination.
III. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We investigate coordinator-free networks of self-interested agents. In the following, we describe network characteristics, measures used in our study, and the strategy space.
A. Network Characteristics
Fundamentals N = {0, ..., n − 1} is a set of identifiers of agents that form a network. We see two types of contacts in a network: contacts a node can choose, i.e., additional contacts, and those it is always linked to, i.e., fixed contacts. This is natural, e.g., relatives or neighbors are fixed, while a person is free to choose his friends or business contacts.
) be the set of all contacts (set of all additional contacts) of Agent i. Further, let | · | denote the cardinality of a set. E.g., |K i | is the number of contacts of Agent i. If we do not have a specific agent in mind (here, and for all other sets as well), then we leave the subscript aside. We refer to the network structure consisting of fixed contacts as fixed network structure. To keep the analysis manageable, the fixed network structure is a ring in our case, i.e., each agent i ∈ N has two fixed contacts: the agent left of Agent i, Agent (i − 1) mod n and the one to the right, namely, Agent (i + 1) mod n.
Kleinberg Distributions In [3] Kleinberg has investigated the routing complexity in random networks with an initial network structure. According to [3] the average number of hops in a ring plus a random matching is minimal if all pairs of nodes (u, v) are contacts with a probability proportional
is the number of steps in the original network, and r k the dimension of the network, e.g., r k = 1 for a ring of nodes). We will refer to these networks as networks with a Kleinberg distribution. [3] contains a proof that shows that there exists a constant β so that nodes deliver requests in β · log 2 (n) steps with high probability. [3] assumes cooperative nodes and leaves action selection aside. Even though [3] is important from an algorithmic perspective, it is still necessary to investigate if agents have an interest to form such networks.
B. System Model
One-Shot vs. Repeated Interactions In large networks, we frequently have the following scenario: Endpoints of a forwarding chain interact only once, i.e., play a one-shot game, while contacts interact repeatedly. This scenario is interesting: Theory predicts uncooperative behavior in oneshot cooperation games [5] ; on the other hand, cooperation can evolve if the game is played repeatedly [5] . We focus on the described scenario, instead of allowing repeated interactions between endpoints of a forwarding chain. Based on the scenario described, we analyze the payoffs after each agent issued one request to each other agent in the following. We do not investigate any intermediate states, since, otherwise, contacts would also interact only once (or few times), and this would change the nature of the game.
Requests We want to calculate the expected payoff of an agent. To simplify the analysis, we assume that for each request r there exists only one agent that can answer it. Structured P2P systems [19] , to give an example, meet this condition. We refer to this agent as the destination of request r (short form: dest(r)). Note that a node does not have to know the destination of a request, but a contact that is closer to the destination. E.g., if someone wants to know 'When did the Mayflower reach Cape Cod?', he does not have to know a history professor -someone who probably knows a professor, e.g., a history student, is sufficient as well. We assume that destinations of requests issued are uniformly distributed. We refer to the creator of a request as the issuer of request r (short form: iss(r)). If the destination of a request processes the request, it sends the answer directly to the issuer. (We will explain how agents can estimate the degree of cooperation of other agents in Section III-C.) We refer to the first agent that receives a request r as the first forwarder (short form ff(r)). Next to the first forwarder, there normally are further forwarders, and the average number of hops if forwarding is only along fixed contacts is n−1 4 : This is because the maximal distance in the fixed network structure is half of the size of the ring ( n−1 2 ), and the expected distance is half of it. Leaving the Network Issuing requests is either beneficial or not. Thus, agents either issue requests, or they leave the network, i.e., use Strategy Dropout (cf. Section III-E).
C. Assumptions
Network We assume that nodes have some address in an address space. This can be their IP-address, a physical address such as a city, or some knowledge domain as in the history example above. Further, we investigate networks where an agent knows which one of its contacts is closest to the destination of a given request. This implies the existence of a distance function in the address space. In our case this is the number of hops in the fixed network structure. Having an intuition about which contact is closest to a given destination is a feature of many networks [20] , [21] .
Time We assume that agents process requests immediately, and that each message hop lasts a fixed amount of time. Still, the processing time of a request depends on the number of hops during the processing: It is proportional to the number of hops it needs.
Uncertainty We assume that real-world agents use some kind of reputation system [22] to estimate the degree of cooperation of other agents, e.g., eigentrust [22] , or feedback payments [10] . The perception of the behavior of other agents may be erroneous. Note that we will not discuss challenges of reputation systems like entering the system here, since they depend on the respective reputation system.
Utility We assume that an agent's utility increases and decreases with its payoff.
D. Measures
We now introduce measures used in this paper. The payoff is the difference of income and expenditure.
Definition 3.1: The payoff of Agent i is:
An agent benefits from the system every time it receives an answer to one of its requests. Let R i be the set of requests Agent i creates, and let R i→j ⊆ R i be those requests that Agent i forwards to Agent j. For some requests Agent i receives an answer: Let A i ⊆ R i be the set of requests that have been answered, and let A i→j ⊆ R i→j be the set of requests that have been answered and that Agent i had issued to Agent j. The faster an agent i receives an answer, the higher is the benefit, i.e., the benefit of an answer depends on a discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] and on the number of hops h(req) a request req ∈ A i needs to be answered. The benefit of an answer is multiplied with cost factor a. Definition 3.2: The income of an agent i when it receives an answer to its request req ∈ A i is:
The income of Agent i is the sum of the incomes corresponding to the answers Agent i received:
Expenditures are processing costs and contact-maintenance costs. We start by explaining the former.
An agent can process requests on behalf of others. Let F i be the set of requests Agent i forwards (i.e., R i ∩ F i = ∅), and let W i be the set of requests Agent i answers (W for W ork). Let F i→j ⊆ F i be the set of requests that Agent i forwards to Agent j, and let W i→j be the requests that Agent i forwarded to Agent j and where j is the destination. The cost of issuing (forwarding, answering) a request is q (f , w). Next to processing costs there are contact-maintenance costs. To define them, we need the two following auxiliary functions:
true if Node j is additional contact of Node i false else (1) nr(i, j) = number of time units when g(i, j) holds (2) The cost of maintaining an additional contact per time unit is c. r(i) are additional-contacts maintenance costs of Node i: r(i) = n∈N nr(i, n) Social Welfare Besides the payoff of an agent, we want to quantify the success of the system as a whole, i.e., the value function v [13] , which is also known as social welfare [23] .
Definition 3.5: The value function v of the system is:
Definition 3.6: A system is efficient if its value function v is maximal. Cooperation The efficiency of a system depends on the degree of cooperation of its agents. We refer to the degree of cooperation of Agent i as C(i). C(i) is the ratio of all requests Agent i processes among the ones received. Following our assumption Uncertainty, agents use some reputation system. To generalize from the concrete method to estimate the degree of cooperation, we propose having (I) an abstract method and (II) an unreliability factor. (I) With Method 'isCooperative(Agent j, Threshold t)' an agent i can test whether the degree of cooperation C(j) of an agent j is higher than or equal to a threshold t i chosen by i (cf. Algorithm 1 Connectivity Two auxiliary functions are the distance between agents and the normalized distance. The former is the number of intermediaries between two agents in the fixed network structure, and the latter is the normalization of it.
Definition 3.7: The distance between two Agents i, j is:
One measure that describes how efficiently agents use the system is the average number of hops h. A smaller average number of hops leads to less forwarding load (if all other parameters remain the same).
Definition 3.9:
Measure h ∆ (i) is the number of hops relative to the distance to the destination for Agent i's requests: Definition 3.10:
is the average number of hops of Agent i's requests that it has forwarded to its contact j:
Definition 3.11:
E. Strategy Space
Agent behavior can be manifold. There are aspects of agent behavior that are well known and do not change. For instance, [24] shows that humans use threshold strategies when dealing with requests on behalf of others. Consequently, we describe these known aspects of the behavior by means of pseudocode. Still, the respective threshold value is unclear, and we allow agents to choose this value, as we will explain in the remainder of the section. Apart from threshold strategies, most aspects of agent behavior are unknown, and we model them by means of a vector of parameters called strategy vector S. We start with action selection and continue with link selection. Table II 
Processing Humans in coordinator-free environments use threshold strategies when processing a request on behalf of others [24] : If a player i issues requests to a contact j, and the fraction of these requests answered is less than a certain threshold value, player i ignores requests from contact j. In other words, human players hold a contact responsible for the whole forwarding chain (even though someone else in the forwarding chain might have dropped the requests). This makes sense -a contact is responsible for selecting cooperative contacts. Agents in our scenario use threshold strategies as well, i.e., behave as described in Algorithm 2. For each request, an agent tests whether the predecessor in the forwarding chain qualifies (Line 1). 'Qualifies' means that the forwarder has a degree of cooperation that is at least as high as the expectation of the agent: An agent ignores requests from contacts which have a lower degree of cooperation than threshold contactC (contact-cooperation threshold). An agent can use a timeout scheme to detect whether a request has been dropped. Further, from an economic point of view, it does not make a difference whether a contact drops a request, or whether it is lost due to a technical defect etc. In both cases, a contact that would have processed the request is more useful for the issuer. An agent can decide whether it is willing to process a request even if the predecessor in the forwarding chain qualifies (Line 1). Thus, in our model, an agent processes a request with probability ownCoop (Line 1).
Link Selection
The link-selection strategy of an agent specifies under which conditions the agent chooses and maintains additional contacts. We use four parameters/conditions to model link selection. Note that all four conditions have to hold, otherwise the agent drops the respective additional contact.
1) An agent can specify how many additional contacts it wants to have at most, by parameter maxC.
2) The degree of cooperation of a potential contact has to be higher than threshold additionalCC (additional contact cooperation threshold).
3) The average processing time of requests an agent i forwards to a contact j, i.e., h ∆ (i|j), has to be less than or equal to threshold maxP rocessingT ime. While parameter additionalCC defines which degree of cooperation an agent demands from its additional contacts, maxP rocessingT ime is an additional condition on the average processing times. 4) An agent can specify the distribution of its contacts:
Parameter distribution is a probability distribution over the underlying address space (or a density function in case of a continuous address space). If an agent i fulfills Conditions 1 to 3, then a potential additional contact chooses i with a probability proportional to the specified value in the probability distribution (cf. [3] ). Common Strategies Having introduced the strategy space, we now explain that one can model strategies known from literature:
• An Action-Selection Altruist [25] does not use the system, but processes each request it receives (ownCoop = 1, sendRequest = false and contactC = 0).
• A Link-Selection Altruist [25] accepts arbitrarily cooperative contacts (additionalCC = 0, and maxC is a large constant).
• An Action-Selection Free-Rider does not process requests on behalf of others: ownCoop = 0 [4].
• A Link-Selection Free-Rider does not contribute to the network structure, i.e., maxC = 0 [26] .
• A Dropout neither uses the network nor contributes to it (sendRequest = false, maxC = ownCoop = 0). • Threshold Strategies: Humans cooperate with others only if they process a certain number of their requests, i.e., humans set contactC to some value v. The same is known for choosing contacts [27] , i.e., humans normally set additionalCC to some value. Thus, we can describe strategies known from literature by our strategy set, as well as many other strategies.
To ease the analysis to some degree, we assume that maxC is an exogenous parameter. In [28] , we experimentally identify values for maxC in different equilibria using evolutionary algorithms.
To sum up, the strategy space S of an agent is as follows:
Further, let S(i) be the strategy vector of Agent i.
IV. NETWORK EFFICIENCY
Our objective is finding network equilibria. In our analysis, we start with equilibria for pairs of contacts. Afterwards, we use these results to identify equilibria in the general case, i.e., n ≥ 2.
Nash Equilibrium A Nash equilibrium is a state where no player i can increase its payoff payoff (i) by changing its strategy S(i) [29] .
Cooperative Equilibrium and Inefficient Network In the following, we will show that if all agents have the same strategy, and if the strategy is as follows, then they are in an equilibrium:
We refer to this equilibrium as the cooperative equilibrium: All agents send requests, cooperate and have Kleinbergdistributed additional contacts, i.e., all agents have Strategy S c . Further, they do not accept agents as additional contacts that process their requests slower than their additional contacts do on average. This strategy yields high social welfare, as we describe in Section IV-B2. Next to the cooperative equilibrium there is a second one. We refer to it as the inefficient network, i.e., agents have Strategy S i : Agents leave the network and consequently do not have any distribution of additional contacts, nor any threshold for the processing times of their requests, both denoted as '-'.
Altruism We exclude Strategy Action-Selection Altruist. This strategy has only expenditures, but never income. Strategy Dropout always is more successful. Thus, being an Action-Selection Altruist is never part of an equilibrium.
In the following, we illustrate the situation only for one agent, Player i, when investigating symmetric cases.
A. Contact Relations
We start with a simple setup: We analyze the relation between two players, Player i and Player j. This setup allows studying the relationship between two contacts. In this section, we show that there are (at least) two equilibria in the two-player setup: the inefficient network and the cooperative one. While the inefficient network always is an equilibrium, cooperation is contingent on certain conditions, as we explain in the following.
Inefficient Network Both players are dropouts (cf. Section II; sendRequest = f alse). None of them has an advantage by joining the network again, since the other one is not contributing. Strategy Dropout (with zero payoff) dominates action-selection free-riding: action-selection freeriders have expenditures but no income.
Cooperative Equilibria We now find exogenous parameter values so that full cooperation, i.e., C(i) = 1.0, is an equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1: Two contacts, Player i and Player j, cooperate to the highest possible extent if the following conditions hold. (Note that the conditions also have to hold in the symmetric case, where i is exchanged with j and j with i.)
and isCooperative(i, contactC j = 1) and
The third condition describes the relation of the cost factors and the number of requests Agent i creates and forwards to Agent j (|R i→j |). As long as the benefit for receiving an answer (a) is high compared to the cost of issuing requests (q) or maintaining additional contacts (c) as well as the cost of processing requests (w · |W j→i | + f · |F j→i |), the third condition holds. Thus, the first two conditions are much more important: A player has to be fully cooperative, since players accept only fully cooperative contacts.
Note that Lemma 4.1 has an important implication: In the cooperative equilibrium, contacts cooperate at least as much as their contacts expect from them, and vice versa. Thus, only bilateral contacts, i.e., Agent i trusts Agent j, and vice versa, are stable.
In the efficient state the degree of cooperation is maximal, i.e., ownCoop i = contactC j = additionalCC j = 1. Here, the efficient state is only an equilibrium if the error when estimating the degree of cooperation is less than 50%, see [28] .
B. n-Player Game
In the n-Player Game, agents can choose actions and contacts. Solving games with n players where players can modify the structure of the system is difficult [1] , [2] . We take a statistical view and assume that agents choose the position of their additional contacts following a probability distribution.
As we have seen in Section IV-A, agents cooperate with their contacts. Thus, we can assume that agents choose the closest contact to the destination of a request when forwarding requests.
With n players, agents have to forward many requests, and the structure of the system, i.e., link selection, plays a Compared to the 2-Player Game, the network structure might change in n-Player Games, and forwarding costs play a role. While the income is as in Definition 3.3, the expected value of the expenditure E[expenditure(i)] changes. In particular, cost of forwarding and contact-maintenance costs increase.
For (E[income(i)] > E[expenditure(i)]), Strategy
Dropout again is not beneficial. Formula (6) depends on Player i's forwarding load |F i |. The forwarding load itself depends on the network structure. 1) Contact Selection -Simplistic Case: The network structure results from link-selection strategies. In the following, we investigate two cases: In Case A, agents base their decision of processing a request on the contact structure of their contacts, in Case B, they take the distribution of the agents in a forwarding chain (over the address space) into account. As we will see, the strategies for both cases differ. We start with Case A. Case B follows in Section IV-B2.
As a prerequisite for our analysis, we have to understand the forwarding load in the fixed network structure. In such a network, i.e., a ring of players, the forwarding load is likely to be high. Let C be the average degree of cooperation. Then the probability p(h) that a request is processed over h hops is: p(h) = C h Example: Figure 1 graphs p(h) . It shows p(h) for a small population (40 + 1 agents). Every agent processes 80% of the requests. Since the initial structure is a ring, there are at most 20 agents in the forwarding chain. With each step the probability that the request will be processed successfully decreases.
For large n, p(h) converges against a continuous distribution. Hence, we show the continuous case here and in the following.
No Additional Contacts If an agent does not have any additional contacts, the expected benefit of sending a request over h hops E h (h) is: expected benefit of issuing a set of n − 1 requests such that the destinations of the requests are in the address space of a different agent is:
We multiply the sum with two, since there are
2 agents left and right on the ring structure. Note that we omit rounding operators for non-integer values of positions or numbers of nodes to ease presentation. -Even though Formula (7) gives us the expected benefit, we will also introduce an approximation of it that is easier to work with:
E a (n) converges against E(n) for large numbers of agents. Expected Benefit with Additional Contacts With additional contacts the expected benefit E(n) changes.
Example: For an illustration see Figure 2 . In contrast to the situation illustrated in Figure 1 , the agent has three additional contacts. One is exactly 20 hops away, the other ones 11 hops (one right, one left). The grey area is the probability mass won, i.e., where the agent had failed to get answers before it has added the contacts.
The benefit of having additional contacts is maximal if the probability mass won is maximal. If agents do not take the contacts of contacts into account, the distribution of additional contacts is approximately optimal, i.e., brings the maximal benefit, if they all have about the same distance to the next contact. For the exact positions see Lemma 4.2.
Optimal Positions An agent that wants to maximize its payoff has to find optimal positions p i , i ∈ [1, ..., |K
+ |] for its |K + | additional contacts. (For the sake of simplification we assume that the number of additional contacts is odd.) If an agent does not take the distribution of contacts of contacts into account, the optimal positions of its contacts are as follows:
Lemma 4.2: If agents process requests independently from the contact distribution of their contacts, then the optimal positions of the contacts of an agent with position p 0 = 0 are as follows: One of the contacts is on the other side of the ring, i.e., p |K + | = n−1 2 ; every other contact with position p has a counterpart with position (n − p). For i = 1...
the optimal positions are as follows:
[28] contains a proof. Lack of Efficiency The situation in Figure 2 is not efficient, because contacts and contacts of contacts have almost the same positions, i.e., contacts of contacts lead only to little benefit. E.g., the agents in the previous example would be additional contacts of each other, i.e., they would not benefit from contacts of contacts.
We find the implications of Lemma 4.2 surprising: Without an incentive to form efficient network structures, payoffmaximizing agents distribute their contacts uniformly, and we are not aware of a real-world system that gives such an incentive.
2) Contact Selection -General Case: We now investigate networks where agents process requests of their contacts dependent on how fast their contacts (and the forwarding chains) process their requests, i.e., we are in Case B.
Contact relations have two aspects: First, an agent wants to have additional contacts so that it can get answers to its requests. Second, an agent wants to be chosen as an additional contact: Namely, since contact relations are bilateral, this is a prerequisite for the first aspect. The first aspect leads to the following: Agents try to choose agents as additional contacts that have Kleinberg-distributed contacts (because then request processing is fastest). Because of the second aspect, an agent is motivated to have Kleinbergdistributed additional contacts himself, because otherwise the agent is not attractive as an additional contact for other agents. While Kleinberg et al. [3] show that their distribution is optimal, it is unclear whether payoff-maximizing agents form such networks. Our contribution is to show that a Kleinberg distribution is indeed an equilibrium. To do so, we take a Kleinberg distribution for each agent as a starting point and check whether an agent has a reason to change its contact distribution. Note that we already know from Section IV-A that additional contacts cooperate.
Beneficial Contacts Due to the discount factor, the benefit of an agent decreases with the number of hops/amount of time between issuing a request and receiving an answer. Two points influence the number of hops: (i) The number of contacts of an agent and (ii) the distribution of additional contacts of an agent's contacts. For (i) an agent needs additional contacts and has to be attractive for other agents. An agent is attractive if its contacts process requests quickly (ii). According to [3] , agents route requests optimally if they use a Kleinberg distribution.
Evaluation of Contacts Since an agent cannot control directly how its contacts distribute their contacts, it has to rely on another technique. One option is observing the number of hops (or the time) until it obtains an answer for requests forwarded to the contact in question. If requests routed over a contact are forwarded over too many hops (and the discount factor is high), the contact is not useful enough.
Drop-Slow-Contacts (DSC) Strategy: An agent i measures the time its requests need, i.e., h ∆ (i). It drops an additional contact j if it processes requests slower than an average contact, i.e., if h ∆ (i) < h ∆ (i|j) holds.
[28] proves that DSC is an cooperative equilibrium. The proof reflects that exchanging a fully cooperative contact j that processes requests slower than a fully cooperative Agent i with i yields a higher payoff.
This strategy gives agents an incentive to process requests as fast as possible if they want to have additional contacts themselves, since they compete with other contacts. Note that this strategy is cheap, i.e., does not need extra messages or complex computations.
Example: Agent i has three additional contacts: Contacts j, k, l. Suppose that the requests of Agent i have an average processing time of h ∆ (i) = 2.6, and the average processing times of requests that Agent i forwarded to its contacts are: h ∆ (i|j) = 2, h ∆ (i|k) = 2, and h ∆ (i|l) = 4. Since h ∆ (i) < h ∆ (i|l), Agent i should drop Contact l, or try to exchange l against an agent with better performance.
We now look at the implications of DSC. First, we look at a special case, i.e., is there an incentive to change from Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts to a uniform distribution? Then we deal with the general case.
Let us assume that all agents have distributed their contacts according to a Kleinberg distribution, except for Agent u. u has uniformly distributed contacts and is additional contact of Agent i. Should i replace u with another Agent k? To answer this question, we look at the expected number of hops of i's requests, depending on the contact.
Contact with Uniform Contacts: If Agent i keeps Contact u, the expected value of the number of hops is (1 + β · log 2 (n)) (with a fixed constant β from the respective proof in [3] ): The uniformly distributed contacts of Contact u are not beneficial to Agent i, when i wants to forward a request to an agent in the neighborhood of u, because the additional contacts of u are not close to u itself. Since Contact u does not have additional contacts close to itself, it can only give the request to one of its fixed contacts. If its contacts follow a Kleinberg distribution, the expected value for the number of hops is β · log 2 (n) [3] . This means that there is an extra step due to Contact u's lack of contacts in its neighborhood.
Contact with Kleinberg Distributed Contacts: If Agent i exchanges Contact u with uniformly distributed additional contacts against Agent k with Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts, the expected value for the number of hops is β · log 2 (n) [3] and not 1 + β · log 2 (n). Lemma 4.3: The payoff of Agent i increases for every request it forwards to Agent k with Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts, compared to the case where i uses Contact u with uniformly distributed additional contacts, by the following amount:
[28] contains a proof. The idea of the proof is comparing the expected payoffs of Agent i having Contact u or Contact k.
-The consequence of the lemma is as follows: Agent i exchanges u against Agent k, since it leads to a higher payoff. This means that agents prefer contacts with a Kleinberg distribution. In other words, an agent in a Kleinberg network cannot increase its payoff by switching to a uniform distribution: Its additional contacts would replace it with other contacts, i.e., this agent would loose its contacts.
Other Distributions: Contacts that have a Kleinberg distribution with r = 1 (cf. Section II), i.e., with an inefficient r k -value, or any other distribution are not stable either. If an additional contact has not distributed its additional contacts in an optimal way, then the number of hops increases, i.e., there exists an > 0 so that the number of hops increases by about steps. Consequently, the payoff of an agent that has an additional contact with a suboptimal distribution of additional contacts is lower.
Lemma 4.4: The payoff of Agent i increases for every request it forwards to Agent k with Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts, compared to the case where i uses Contact u with a distribution of additional contacts that is different from a Kleinberg distribution.
[28] contains a proof. The idea behind it is again the comparison of the expected payoffs. -Due to Lemma 4.4, an agent exchanges a contact with non-optimal additional contacts against an agent with Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts.
Summary In Lemma 4.1 we show under which conditions contacts cooperate. Further, agents either use the DSC Strategy, or they do not. For the second case, Lemma 4.2 shows how agents should choose their additional contacts. Note that this situation is inefficient (cf. Section IV-B1). The social welfare is higher in the first case where agents use the DSC Strategy. Lemmata 4.3 and 4.4 show that all agents using the strategy and having Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts are in equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSIONS Agents in networks typically can choose both their actionselection as well as their link-selection strategy. Understanding the behavior of agents is essential to identify promising strategies, or to design mechanisms to increase the social welfare. We have identified two equilibria: (I) Contacts do not cooperate. In this case it is rational to leave the network. (II) Agents use the DSC Strategy proposed in this article. It is as follows: An agent measures the time its requests passed on to an additional contact need to be answered. If this time is larger than the average processing time, the agent drops the additional contact. Further, contacts cooperate with each other, and all agents have Kleinberg-distributed additional contacts. The DSC Strategy is cost-free, and agents can increase the social welfare by using it.
